

I-SEM 2025-26 T-1 Capacity Auction Independent Auction Monitor Report

Commission for Regulation of Utilities (CRU) and the
Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation
(NIAUR)

30/05/2025

AUCTION REPORT - REDACTED

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1. INDEPENDENT ASSURANCE REPORT

This report sets out our conclusions in relation to the monitoring of the processes and procedures followed by the System Operators (EirGrid and SONI Ltd; SOs) in conducting the Capacity Market Auction for the 2025/26 T-1 Capacity Auction, with respect to Capacity Auction Submissions submitted between 15th May 2025 and 10:00 on 22nd May 2025, to ensure that it has been correctly carried out in accordance with the SOs' obligations under the Capacity Market Code (CMC).

1.1. SCOPE OF THE REPORT

This report is produced in accordance with the terms of our engagement contract, dated 2nd September 2022, for the purposes of reporting to the Regulatory Authorities (RAs) – the Commission for Regulation of Utilities (CRU) and the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation (UR) – in connection with CEPA's arrangement as the Capacity Auction Monitor for the I-SEM Capacity Market.

Under the CMC, the SOs have various obligations with respect to qualification for and conducting of the Capacity Auctions. These obligations apply to Capacity Auctions which the SOs are required to satisfy under the CMC. The SEM Committee's decision approving the CMC and its associated procedures are available here:

<https://www.semcommittee.com/news-centre/publication-i-sem-crm-capacity-market-code-decision>

The most up to date version of the CMC, and approved and pending modifications, are available here:

<https://www.sem-o.com/rules-and-modifications/capacity-market-modifications/market-rules/>

CEPA's role as the appointed Capacity Auction Monitor for the I-SEM is to provide independent assurance to the market and the Regulatory Authorities (RAs) that the SOs have correctly carried out their obligations under the CMC in respect of qualification for, and running of, the Capacity Auctions, as set out in the Terms of Reference for the Capacity Auction Monitor.²

We monitored the processes and procedures followed by the SOs for the Capacity Auction, as far as possible, in accordance with our Terms of Reference for this engagement. We provide our conclusions (in Section 1.4 below) in relation to compliance with the CMC based on our obligations. This report is provided in accordance with Section B.10.4 of the CMC, which sets out the requirement for the Capacity Auction Monitor to provide a report to the RAs:

- confirming the list of Participants with Capacity Market Units that have been allocated Awarded Capacity;
- stating whether or not the Capacity Auction Monitor considers that the Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with this Code; and
- identifying any actual or potential non-compliance with the CMC by the SOs.

Note that, except where expressly stated, we did not audit or otherwise verify the information provided to us by the SOs in the course of our work. A separate Capacity Market Auditor is required to be in place under the CMC, with its obligations set out within the Capacity Market Auditor Terms of Reference. For the avoidance of doubt, CEPA would like to make clear that we are a professional economic advisory firm and not professional accountants.

1.2. OUR APPROACH

We developed a set of protocols and analytical tools to monitor the processes and procedures followed by the SOs for the Capacity Auction.

² SEM Committee (2017): 'Capacity Remuneration Mechanism – Terms of Reference for the Capacity Market Auditor and Capacity Auction Monitor', SEM-17-023.

In carrying out our duties, we have followed a system of quality control, professional conduct, and ethical behaviour which we consider to be of a standard at least as demanding as that required by ISAE 3000 (Revised). This includes documented policies and procedures related to our monitoring activities, leadership responsibilities for quality control in the firm, independence and ethical requirements and management of human resources.

We have performed our work as the appointed Capacity Auction Monitor based on our fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality, and professional behaviour.

1.3. INHERENT LIMITATIONS

Our conclusions are based on historical information. The projection of any information or conclusions in the attached report to any future periods would be inappropriate.

Our examination excludes audit procedures and accordingly we do not express an audit opinion on the information. We note that the procedures we performed were not designed to and are not likely to reveal fraud.

An outline of the work we performed for the Capacity Auction is included in Appendix A.

1.4. CONCLUSIONS

Our conclusions in this report reflect reasonable assurance in relation to the T-1 Capacity Auction for the 2025/26 Capacity Year.

We believe that the procedures performed, and the evidence obtained, provide us with a reasonable basis that, except for the matters described in Section 4 of our report, the Capacity Auction was conducted by the SOs in accordance with the requirements of the CMC.

Actual and potential instances of non-compliance are summarised in Section 4.

1.5. USE OF THE REPORT

This report has been prepared for the exclusive use of the RAs in accordance with the scope of our engagement contract and the RAs' Terms of Reference for the Capacity Auction Monitor.

Our work has been undertaken solely for the purpose of assessing that the SOs have correctly carried out the obligations placed on them under the CMC in carrying out the Capacity Auction. Our work was not planned or conducted with any other objective in mind, and so cannot be relied on for any other purpose. With the exception of providing it to the RAs and the SOs, and publishing it on the SEM Committee website, our report is not to be recited or referred to in any document, copied or made available (in whole or part) to any person without our prior written consent. To the fullest extent permitted by law, CEPA does not accept or assume responsibility to anyone, other than the RAs, for this report or for the conclusions we have formed.



Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd
London, United Kingdom
30th May 2025

2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

2.1. BACKGROUND

In the I-SEM Capacity Market, capacity providers sell qualified capacity to the market to meet the capacity requirement in a future capacity year. Capacity providers who are successful in the Capacity Auction receive a regular capacity payment that assists with funding generation capacity, and, in return, they have an obligation to generate when the system is stressed.

The operation of the Capacity Market and the roles and responsibilities of the market operator – split jointly between the SOs and the Single Electricity Market Operator (SEMO) – are governed by the CMC and the Trading and Settlement Code.

2.2. OUR ROLE AS CAPACITY AUCTION MONITOR

The Terms of Reference for the Capacity Auction Monitor state that:

“The purpose of the Capacity Auction Monitor is to provide independent assurance to the market and the Regulatory Authorities that the System Operators’ are correctly carrying out their obligations under the Capacity Market Code in respect of qualification for and running of Capacity Auctions.”

As Capacity Auction Monitor, we are required to produce a Report on the Capacity Auction, within two Working Days after the SOs have released provisional Capacity Auction Results to Participants, that:

- confirms the list of Participants with Capacity Market Units that have been allocated Awarded Capacity;
- states whether or not the Capacity Auction Monitor considers that the Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the CMC; and
- where applicable, identifies any actual or potential non-compliance with the CMC or other actual or potential irregularity in the conduct of the Capacity Auction, together with the Capacity Auction Monitor’s assessment as to the likely consequences of the actual or potential non-compliance or irregularity.

This report summarises our findings in relation to the Capacity Auction run by the SOs on 22/05/2025.

2.3. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The CMC paragraph B.10.2.1 sets out that:

“The Capacity Auction Monitor shall monitor the processes and procedures followed by the System Operators in carrying out the Qualification Process, conducting Capacity Auctions and related activities under this Code, in accordance with the terms of reference determined by the Regulatory Authorities.”

The basic tasks set out for the Capacity Auction Monitor are:

- monitoring the Qualification Process to ensure that the SOs have complied with the CMC;
- being present at the auctions, with full read access to all key software, including access to all bids and all communications between the SOs and all bidders;
- monitoring the application of algorithms and calculations;
- reporting on whether it considers that the SOs have conducted the Capacity Auction in accordance with the CMC;

- identifying any actual or potential breach of the rules and regulations or other actual or potential irregularities in the conduct of the Capacity Auction by the SOs and an assessment of the consequences; and
- making recommendations on the changes to the CMC, Auction Guidelines and User Guides.

As Capacity Auction Monitor, we are required to report on all issues that we identify, irrespective of materiality.

The scope of the Capacity Auction Monitor's assurance activities shall relate to the System Operators' activities relating to qualification through to the determination of the final auction results under the Code.

2.4. SCOPE EXCLUSIONS

In line with our Terms of Reference, the scope of our review excluded the following:

- Secondary trading market (referenced specifically within Chapter H of the CMC).
- Direct investigation of market manipulation: However, the Terms of Reference states that the Capacity Auction Monitor should bring any incidents of potential market manipulation to the attention of the RAs, should it come across them in carrying out its duties.
- The determination of the LCCs and their underlying methodology: The Capacity Auction Monitor's scope in relation to LCCs is limited to assessing compliance by the SOs with the methodology for determining LCCs, including accordance with relevant procedures and process documentation.
- Auditing of the processes carried out by the SOs: The CMC requires a Capacity Market Auditor to be appointed separately from the Capacity Auction Monitor. Under our Terms of Reference, we are not required to carry out an audit of the processes followed, or information provided, by the SOs in running the auction.
- Monitoring of compliance with obligations of Section L.7 of the CMC regarding SO reporting of REMIT Data on behalf of Participants.

3. AUCTION RESULTS

The Capacity Auction Submission Commencement date for the T-1 Auction was 15th May 2025; the SOs emailed Participants at 09:09 to inform them that the auction gate had opened ahead of the 10:00 as planned opening time. The Capacity Auction Submission End took place at 10:00 on 22nd May 2025.

Capacity Auction Run Start was scheduled for 12:00 on 22nd May 2025. Auction Run was initiated at this time and was completed within a minute of initiation. The auction clearing process was completed within the 24-hour Allowed Timeframe.

The Capacity Auction was run using the Capacity Market Platform (CMP) version 3.3.3.1, according to information displayed in the CMP.

In line with the Final Auction Information Pack (FAIP), the parameters of the Demand Curve used in the 2025/26 T-1 Auction are set out in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Final Demand Curve used in the Capacity Auction, same as in FAIP 2025/26 T-1 Table 1

De-Rated Capacity (MW)	Demand Curve Point (€/MW per year)
0	160,545
331	160,545
331	107,030
1251	0

The minimum capacity needed to satisfy the LCCs were as set out in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: LCCs and minimum MW required, same as in FAIP 2025/26 T-4 Tables 4 and 5

LCC Area 1 Name	Minimum Required Quantity (MW)	Maximum Required Quantity (MW)	Location Constrained Area	Minimum Constraint Price (€/MW)	Maximum Constraint Price (€/MW)
Northern Ireland	2,344.000	20,000.000	L1-2: Northern Ireland	€2,000,000	€1,000,000
Ireland	7,159.000	20,000.000	L1-2: Ireland	€2,000,000	€1,000,000
Greater Dublin	2,334.000	2,499.139.000	L2-1: Greater Dublin	€2,000,000	€1,000,000

There were 38 offers for 30 CMUs in this Capacity Auction. This is out of a total of 180 qualified CMUs, 18 of which had Existing Capacity with a non-zero Firm Offer Requirement (and thus were required to submit offers). Of these, 15 had only Existing Capacity available to offer, and 3 had both Existing and New Capacity available to offer into this Capacity Auction.

35 offers were submitted directly by the relevant Participants, and 3 were generated by the CMP.

A total of 502.842 MW cleared in the auction, with [38] CMUs being awarded capacity in the unconstrained results, and [38] CMUs being awarded capacity in the constrained results.

The Auction Clearing Price was determined in accordance with CMC F.8.3. The Price Setting Offer was a flexible offer cleared at €90,000.00/MW per year (£81,036/MW per year). This is lower than the auction price cap of €160,545.00/MW per year or £137,876.05/per year). In total, [38] offers were cleared at the Auction Clearing Price.

For the determination of the Auction Clearing Price, a total of [38] offers were initially scheduled. The offered quantity scheduled at the Auction Clearing Price was not sufficient to meet the LCC Required Quantities for Northern Ireland, Ireland, or Greater Dublin, and so additional offers needed to clear out of merit. As a result, all [38]

remaining offers were cleared at their respective offer prices up to the Auction Price Cap of €160,545.00/MW per year.

Total Awarded Capacity, LCC Required Quantity, and the shortfall between the two is summarised in Table 3.3 below.

Table 3.3: Constraint status in the auction solution

	L1-1: Northern Ireland	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin
Previously Awarded Capacity (MW) ³	2,171.320	5,776.790	2,222.157
Capacity Cleared in T-1 Auction (MW)	59.061	443.781	0.000
Total Awarded Capacity (MW)	2,230.381	6,220.571	2,222.157
LCC Required Quantity (MW)	2,344.000	7,159.000	2,334.000
Shortfall between Required Quantity and Awarded Capacity (MW)	113.619	938.429	111.843

Of the [X] offers that were cleared following the determination of the Auction Clearing Price out of merit at their respective offer prices, [X] of these offers were for New Capacity and [X] were from clean units.

Table 3.4 shows the relevant quantities of the above offers, as well as a summary of all changes between the unconstrained and constrained solutions.

Table 3.4: Changes between the determination of the Auction Clearing Price and the Auction Solution

CMU ID	Capacity type(s) offered by this CMU	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Offered Quantity (MW)	Cleared Q during Auction Clearing Price determination (MW)	Cleared Q in Auction Solution (MW)	Difference (MW)
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
Total							[X]

Based on the outcome of the T-1 Auction, Table 3.5 lists the participants and corresponding CMUs that have been awarded capacity.

³ From 2025/26 T-4 auction and multi-year contracts cleared in previous capacity market auctions.

3.1. CMUs PROVISIONALLY AWARDED CAPACITY IN THIS CAPACITY AUCTION

Table 3.5: List of participants and CMUs provisionally awarded capacity in the T-1 Capacity Auction for the Capacity Year 2025/26

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
Captured Carbon	PY_000 146	PT_500112	GU_504 230	Wind	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[X]	0.877
Tra Investments Ltd	PY_034 224	PT_402665	GU_407 310	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	0.864
ESB	PY_000 030	PT_400033	CAU_40 0302	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	0.468
iPower Solutions Ltd	PY_000 093	PT_500053	GU_501 130	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[X]	1.976
EIRGRID INTERCONNECTOR DESIGNATED ACTIVITY COMPANY	IO_EIDAC	IO_EIDAC	I_ROIEWIC	Interconnector	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	41.500
Moyle Interconnector or Limited	IO_MOYLE	IO_MOYLE	I_NIMOYLE	Interconnector	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[X]	34.650
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000 128	PT_400144	DSU_40 3820	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing + New	[X]	6.812
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000 128	PT_500078	GU_504 340	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing + New	[X]	4.104
GridBeyond Limited (formerly Endeco Technologies Limited)	PY_000 126	PT_400133	DSU_40 3590	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	0.353

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
Orsted Ireland Green Energy Limited	PY_000068	PT_400062	CAU_400502	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	9.066
Sorne Hill	PY_000038	PT_400038	GU_400550	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	2.048
Orsted Onshore Green Energy NI Limited	PY_000168	PT_500110	GU_504200	Wind	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[X]	1.046
Statkraft Markets GmbH	PY_034046	PT_402540	GU_405070	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	1.513
Shannonbridge Power Limited	PY_034099	PT_402580	GU_404380	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	1.640
Shannonbridge Power Limited	PY_034099	PT_402580	GU_404390	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	1.640
Aughinish Alumina Ltd	PY_000024	PT_400024	DSU_403790	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	12.425
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400181	Gas Turbine - IED	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	74.790
AC Automation (UK) Ltd	PY_000109	PT_500064	DSU_501200	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[X]	3.874
Empower Generation Limited	PY_000111	PT_500073	GU_501230	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[X]	1.454
Electroroute	PY_000171	PT_502534	GU_504040	Wind	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[X]	3.042
Energia Customer	PY_000043	PT_400043	GU_400660	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	2.457

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
Solutions Limited									
Greenlink Interconnect or Limited	IO_GRN LK	IO_GRNLK	I_ROIGR LK	Interconnector	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	261.072
Lagan Energy Ballymena	PY_034 222	PT_502573	GU_504 320	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[X]	4.330
Heron Storage BESS	PY_034 181	PT_502562	GU_504 250	Other Storage	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[X]	1.198
iPower Solutions Ltd	PY_000 093	PT_500053	DSU_50 3450	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[X]	2.510
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000 114	PT_400116	DSU_40 3760	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing + New	[X]	22.770
Veolia Alternative Energy Ireland Limited	PY_000 122	PT_400124	DSU_40 1490	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	0.688
iPower Solutions Ltd	PY_000 093	PT_402574	DSU_40 3650	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[X]	1.270
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000 114	PT_400116	DSU_40 3860	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[X]	2.126
GridBeyond Limited (formerly Endeco Technologies Limited)	PY_000 126	PT_400133	DSU_40 3750	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[X]	0.279

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
Captured Carbon	PY_000146	PT_500112	GU_504230	Wind	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[✕]	0.877
Tra Investments Ltd	PY_034224	PT_402665	GU_407310	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[✕]	0.864

4. SUMMARY OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED WITH THE CAPACITY AUCTION PROCESS

We performed our role as Capacity Auction Monitor in relation to the 2025/26 T-1 Capacity Auction, which took place on 22nd May 2025, in line with our obligations to monitor the conduct of the SOs in operating the Capacity Auctions. In Section 4.1, we summarise the identified instances of non-compliance within the areas of the CMC that are in the Monitor's scope, before presenting some additional considerations in Section 4.2.

4.1. SUMMARY OF ISSUES

In carrying out our duties, we identified **8 issues** that we consider constitute non-compliance with the CMC, noting our obligation to report all issues to the RAs irrespective of materiality. The table below sets out a high-level summary of actual or potential instances of non-compliance identified within the Capacity Auction process. Detailed issue logs are included in Appendix B.

Table 4.1: Summary of issues identified within the Capacity Auction process.⁴

Issue Log	Description
016	The SOs did not include the 'final Capacity Auction Threshold for the Capacity Auction' in the Final Auction Information Pack, as is required under CMC F.5.1.3. We do not believe this to have had an impact on the auction.
017	Section E.7.8 of the CMC outlines the Alternative Qualification Process (AQP) for the SOs to apply under certain circumstances. In the FQRs, as in the PQRs, the SOs have not always followed the approach set out in E.7.8.2. This issue did not have an impact on the auction.
018	There were a number of changes between Provisional Qualification Decisions and Final Qualification decisions, for which the reasons were not explained to Participants through the FQRs, as is required by CMC E.9.4.11. We would not expect this to have a material impact on the auction.
019	The SOs were not compliant with F.4.1.1 as they did not submit the LCC determinations (set out in F.4.1.1) to the RAs by the date specified in the Capacity Market Code. We do not believe this to have had an impact on the auction, as it relates only to the timing of passing of information between SOs and RAs, and it did not have any impact on when the Participants received the information via the publication of the FAIP.
020	<p>Two issues relating to the determination of Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) for Aggregated Generator Units (AGUs) resulted in non-compliance with E.8.2.8. For one of these units, [X], there was a more material difference at PQRs that has since been addressed. For the other unit, [X], the GDRCN was set to 0 which was at the time of the PQRs compliant with E.8.2.8. However, since publication of PQRs, two generators [X] and [X], have been accepted and both have a positive Gross De-Rated Capacity (New).</p> <p>We consider this could have an impact on the auction because [X] has a non-zero Net Existing De-rated Capacity. [X] has no Net Existing De-rated Capacity and therefore does not contribute to an impact. However, the materiality of these impacts would be very low, if any, given the discrepancy for [X] is only 0.001 MWs.</p>
022	We find several cases of non-compliance with CMC E.8.1.1 where the Existing and Total Initial Capacities determined by the System Operators differ from the values submitted in the Applications for Qualification, without an amend code provided to explain the differences.
023	We find several issues of non-compliance relating to the determination of Firm Offer Requirements of Capacity Market Units. In some instances, we observe that some of the differences may be caused by rounding, and would be unlikely to have a material impact.

⁴ Issue numbers are assigned to potential instances of non-compliance as they are identified. Issue numbers missing from the table (e.g., Issue 017) may reflect issues investigated as part of the Monitor's Qualification Report for this Auction or may reflect issues that have been investigated and determined not to represent non-compliance with the CMC.

Issue Log	Description
	However, there are cases where the differences appear to be more substantial and may present a material impact.
027	We have identified four units where the CMU level values for Gross De-rated Capacity Existing have not been calculated in line with E.8.3.2. From the PQRs, we understand this to be a presentational issue in the CMP and have noted this in previous qualification processes. The CMP does not overwrite the calculation done under E.8.3.1 (a) to present the values compliant with E.8.3.2 at a CMU level. Auction bids are made at the CMU level, so it is important that the CMU level values in the CMP are correct. We note that the Existing Net De-Rated Capacity for the four units identified as having an incorrect GDRCE, and the New Net De-Rated Capacity for the other unit, is 0. Therefore, there would be no impact on the Auction bids for these units.

4.2. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

This sub-section contains comments and observations that we believe do not represent non-compliance with the CMC, but we consider it appropriate to summarise for the RAs' attention.

4.2.1. Rounding of Published Quantities

CMC paragraph L.5.4.1 requires the SOs to use consistent numerical rounding of all published quantities.

We note that a number of values in the FAIP (v1.0) and CAT for 2025/26 T-1 are reported to a smaller number of decimal places.

A number of values in the Auction Results displayed on the CMP are also reported to a smaller number of decimal places for €/£ and MW values.

In the FAIP, for example:

- Values are shown to the nearest MW, instead of to three decimals for the Demand Curve; Capacity Requirement and Short-Term Reserve values; Locational Capacity Constraint; and
- Values are shown to nearest € value instead of to nearest cent/pence for the following values: Demand Curve, Performance Security Rate, and Termination Rate.

Whilst in the Capacity Auction Timetable, times are provided to the nearest minute, rather than second.

Instances where the SOs have published values to fewer decimal places do not necessarily constitute non-compliance, as applying the convention of dropping zeros after the decimal point if not followed by non-zero values is a consistent approach, but could cause ambiguity. For example, for the Capacity Requirement, stating the value as 6174 implies the value is 6174.000. However, stating to the full 3 decimal places (with .000) provides clarity that the value is not rounded from 6174.123, for example.

We also raised this in the 24/25 T-1 Qualification and Auction Reports, and the 23/24 T-1 Qualification Report. To rule out ambiguity and to align with the CMC, the SOs should consider publishing values to the specified number of decimal places for all published documents going forward.

Appendix A SUMMARY OF WORK PERFORMED

Our fieldwork was completed on the 22nd May 2025 at the System Operators' premises at The Oval, Shelbourne Road, Dublin. Additional members of the CAM team also observed the process for this Auction using conference calling and screen-sharing. The areas of the Code checked at the time of issuing this report are outlined in the table below.

The areas of the Code checked at the time of issuing this report are outlined in the table below.

Table A.1: Summary of CMC sections checked by the Monitor in preparing this report

CMC Chapter	CMC Subsection	CMC Paragraph
C. De-Rating and Capacity Concepts	C.2 Locational Capacity Constraints	C.2.1.2
	C.2 Locational Capacity Constraints	C.2.2.2
	C.2 Locational Capacity Constraints	C.2.3.1
	C.2 Locational Capacity Constraints	C.2.3.2
	C.3 Initial Capacity	C.3.2.1
	C.3 Initial Capacity	C.3.2.3
	C.3 Initial Capacity	C.3.5.1
D. Pre-Capacity Auction Process	D.2 Capacity Auctions and Timetables	D.2.1.5
		D.2.1.9
		D.2.1.10
		D.2.1.11
		D.2.1.14
		D.2.1.16
		D.2.1.17
E. Qualification	E.1 Purpose of Qualification Process	E.1.1.4
	E.3 Opt-out Notifications	E.3.1.4
	E.4 Application for Qualification	E.4.1.8
	E.5 Exception Applications	E.5.1.10
	E.8 Qualification Calculations	E.7.8.1
		E.7.8.2
		E.8.1.1
		E.8.1.2
		E.8.1.3
		E.8.2.1
		E.8.2.2
		E.8.2.4
		E.8.2.5
		E.8.2.7
		E.8.2.8
		E.8.3.1
		E.8.4.1
		E.8.5.1
		E.8.5.2
		E.8.6.1
		E.8.7.1
		E.8.8.1
		E.8.8.2
		E.8.8.3
		E.8.9.1

CMC Chapter	CMC Subsection	CMC Paragraph
E. Qualification	E.9 Notification of Qualification Decisions	E.8.9.2
		E.9.3.3
		E.9.3.5
		E.9.3.6
		E.9.4.1
		E.9.4.2
		E.9.4.3
		E.9.4.4
		E.9.4.9
		E.9.4.10
F. Capacity Auctions	F.9 Notification of Qualification Decisions	E.9.4.11
		E.9.5.1
	F.1 General	F.1.2.2
		F.2.1.1
		F.3.1.1
	F.2. Capacity Auction Participation	F.3.1.2
		F.3.1.6
		F.3.1.7
	F.3 Demand Curve	F.4.1.1
		F.4.1.2
		F.4.1.4
		F.4.1.5
		F.4.1.6
		F.4.1.7
		F.4.1.8
	F.4 Determination of Locational Capacity Constraints for a Capacity Auction	F.5.1.1
		F.5.1.2
		F.5.1.3
	F.5 Publication of Final	F.6.1.1
		F.6.2.1
	F.6 Capacity Auction Submissions	F.7.1.1
		F.7.1.2
	F.7 Capacity Auction Offers	F.7.1.3
		F.8.1.1
		F.8.2.1
	F.8 Conduct of Capacity Auction	F.8.2.2
		F.8.2.3
		F.8.3.2
		F.8.3.3
		F.8.3.4
		F.8.3.5
		F.8.4.2
		F.8.4.3
		F.8.4.4
		F.8.4.5
		F.8.4.6
		F.8.4.7
		F.8.5.1

CMC Chapter	CMC Subsection	CMC Paragraph
		F.8.6.1
	F.9 Capacity Auction Results	F.9.1.1
		F.9.2.1
		F.9.3.1
K. Exchange Rates	K.2 Methodology	K.2.1.6
L. Data and Information Systems	L.2 Methodology	L.2.2.2
		L.2.3.1
		L.2.4.3
		L.2.4.4
		L.2.5.1
		L.2.5.2
		L.2.5.3
		L.2.5.4
		L.2.5.5
	L.3 Submission, Validation and Rejection of Data Transactions	L.3.1.1
		L.3.1.3
		L.3.1.6
		L.3.1.7
		L.3.1.8
	L.4 Communications Failures	L.4.2.1
		L.4.2.3
		L.4.3.1
		L.4.3.3
		L.4.3.4
		L.4.4.2
		L.4.4.3
	L.5 Data Publication	L.5.4.1

Appendix B **SUMMARIES OF OBSERVED ISSUES RESULTING FROM THE CAPACITY AUCTION PROCESS**

B.1. ISSUE LOG 016

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
016	2025/2026 T-1 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-compliant
Summary			
The SOs did not include the ‘ <i>final Capacity Auction Threshold for the Capacity Auction</i> ’ in the Final Auction Information Pack, as is required under CMC F.5.1.3.			
Description of Issue			
As per CMC F.5.1.2, the SOs are required to publish a Final Auction Information Pack (FAIP) for each Capacity Auction that includes the items listed under CMC F.5.1.3. In the FAIP for the 2025/2026 T-1 Capacity Auction, published on 30 th April 2025, the SOs did not include F.5.1.3 (q), ‘ <i>the final Capacity Auction Threshold for the Capacity Auction</i> ’, as is required.			
Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments			
<p>We consider this to be non-compliance with CMC F.5.1.3. We do not believe this to have had an impact on the auction.</p> <p>We also note that the Capacity Auction Threshold is not defined in the CMC and is not listed as a requirement for inclusion in the IAIP. Under CMC D.3.1.2, the SOs are required to include a Capacity Aggregation Threshold for the Capacity Auction, as determined by the RAs, in the IAIP, and this value was included in the 2025/26 T-1 IAIP.</p> <p>We recommend that the CMC be updated to clarify if the Capacity Auction Threshold referred to in CMC.F.5.1.3 is the same as the Capacity Aggregation Threshold mentioned in CMC D.3.1.2, or alternatively, define the Capacity Auction Threshold in the CMC.</p> <p>The SOs responded to this check, acknowledging this issue and stating how this would be resolved in future.</p> <p>“Capacity Auction Threshold is an undefined term in the current Capacity Market Code. The Final Auction Information Pack did not include this term as it currently remains undefined.</p> <p>The final value for the Capacity Aggregation Threshold is a defined term under the Capacity Market Code. The final value is published in the Initial Auction Information Pack as stated under D.3.1.2(s) of the Capacity market Code. Under the Capacity Market Code, the Capacity Aggregation Threshold is also not referred to the Final Auction Information Pack. Instead, the Code refers to the Capacity Auction Threshold, which is an undefined term.</p> <p>Going forward, we will include the “final Capacity Auction Threshold” term in Final Auction Information Pack as “undefined” until such time as this is resolved in the Capacity Market Code. Once resolved, we will include the amount set out in the definition of Capacity Market Code.”</p>			

B.2. ISSUE LOG 017

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
017	2025/2026 T-1 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant

Summary

Section E.7.8 of the CMC outlines the Alternative Qualification Process (AQP) for the SOs to apply under certain circumstances. In the FQRs, the SOs have in some instances not followed the approach set out in E.7.8.2.

Description of Issue

CMC E.7.8.2 outlines the requirements for the SOs to use in the AQP to determine Qualification Decisions. In the remainder of this Issue Log, we highlight a number of Final Qualification Results that are non-compliant with requirements under E.7.8.2 (f).

E.7.8.2 (f) states that:

the Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) of the Capacity Market Unit in the case of a Demand Side Unit or a Generator Unit referred to in paragraph E.2.1.1(e) that is a Variable Generator Unit, shall be the volume of any Awarded Capacity associated with that unit for the Capacity Year in respect of Existing Capacity (which may be zero);

For the following [X] units, the GDRCE is not equal to the value of Existing Awarded Capacity as required by the application of E.7.8.2 (f). In IL011 of the Monitor's Qualification report, we noted that this was only an issue in the PQRs reported in the CMP and not in the PQDs sent to the RAs.

However, we found a similar list of non-compliant units in the FQRs. All previously identified CMUs are non-compliant, alongside new non-compliant units.

[illegible]

[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]

Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments					
<p>We consider this to be non-compliance with CMC E.7.8.2(f). In all cases, this would not have an impact on the auction because the Net De-rated Capacity (Existing), which determines what can be offered into the auction, is 0 for these units and would still be 0 if calculated correctly. We note that these issues still prevail from IL011 of the qualification report, and so this is also a case of non-compliance with CMC E.9.4.2, but these were corrected for the Final Qualification Decisions.</p> <p>In response to this, the SOs stated that:</p> <p>“The System Operators note the auction monitor’s comments that for all cases of non-compliance, this would not cause an impact on the auction. The System Operator acknowledge this reporting issue is reoccurring. Going forward, the System Operators will seek to implement measures on the Capacity Market Platform to ensure compliance in future auctions and subject to agreement with the Regulatory Authorities. “</p>					

B.3. ISSUE LOG 018

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
018	2025/2026 T-1 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant

Summary

There were a number of changes between Provisional Qualification Decisions and Final Qualification decisions, for which the reasons were not explained to Participants through the FQRs, as is required by CMC E.9.4.11.

Description of Issue

CMC E.9.4.11 states that where a Final Qualification Decision has changed relative to the relevant Provisional Qualification Decision, the SOs shall include in the notification, under paragraph E.9.4.9, both the provisional and final decision or value, so as to identify to the Participant what has changed.

The SOs usually provide this in the form of a “Qualification Note” in the FQRs. For the following units, there were changes between the Provisional Qualification Decisions and Final Qualification Decisions, but a Qualification Note was not provided by the SOs in the FQRs.

We note each unit affected and the detail of the changes in the table below. Please note this Issue Log only relates to the communication of changes as opposed to whether the changes were correct or not.

[illegible]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X] [X]

[X] [X]

[X]

[X] [X]

[X] [X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X] [X]

[X] [X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

[X]

Capacity Auction Monitor's Comments

We consider this to be non-compliant with E.9.4.11. Although communication of the changes is important for the Participants, both for clarity and understanding, the Monitor did not consider any instances where the lack of communication regarding the above changes would have had a material impact on the auction.

The SOs stated in response that:

“The System Operators communicate with Participants during the Application for Review period. We confirm any changes to the Participant that will be reflected in the Final Qualification Decisions. This communication is done through direct email correspondence currently.

The System Operators note this communication is currently not recorded in the Capacity Market Platform for the FQDs itself for Participants in accordance with E.9.4.11.”

Going forward, the System Operators will communicate any changes in value directly to a participant and reflect the change on the platform between the Provisional Qualification Decisions and Final Qualification Decision.”

B.4. ISSUE LOG 019

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
019	2025/2026 T-1 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant
Summary			
The SOs were not compliant with F.4.1.1 as they did not submit the LCC determinations (set out in F.4.1.1) to the RAs by the date specified in the Capacity Market Code.			
Description of Issue			
<p>Under CMC F.4.1.4, the SOs shall determine the LCCs as required by section F.4.1.1. However, we find that the SOs submitted the file to the RAs later than the date specified in the code.</p> <p>CMC F.4.1.4 states that:</p> <p><i>“The System Operators shall make a determination under paragraph F.4.1.1 based on the Provisional SO Qualification Decisions and submit the values to the Regulatory Authorities no later than two Working Days after the Provisional Qualification Results Date.”</i></p> <p>The SOs made the determinations under F.4.1.1 and sent these to the RAs on 13th March 2025. This is more than two working days after the Provisional Qualification Results were published and the date Provisional Qualification Results date specified in the timetable, both the 25th February 2025.</p>			
Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments			
<p>We therefore determine this to be non-compliance with F.4.1.4.</p> <p>We do not believe this to have had an impact on the auction as it relates only to the timing of passing of information between SOs and RAs and did not have any impact on when the Participants received the information via the publication of the FAIP.</p> <p>The SOs provided a response to this issue:</p> <p><i>“The System Operators note the Capacity Auction Monitor’s comment that this observation did not have an impact on the auction. The System Operator acknowledge this issue and are working to ensure the provision of accurate information to Regulatory Authorities in the agreed upon timeframe in future auctions in accordance with F.4.1.1. In addition, the System Operator will explore whether it is appropriate to amend to a longer timeframe under F.4.1.1. to limit this observation recurring in the future.”</i></p>			

B.5. ISSUE LOG 020

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
020	2025/2026 T-1 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-compliant
Summary			
<p>Two issues relating to the determination of Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) for Aggregated Generator Units (AGUs) have resulted in non-compliance with E.8.2.8.</p> <p>For one of these units, [REDACTED], there was a more material difference at PQRs that has been addressed. For the other unit, [REDACTED], the GDRCN was set to [REDACTED] which was at the time of the PQRs was compliant with E.8.2.8. However, since publication of PQRs, two generators, [REDACTED], have been accepted and both have a positive Gross De-Rated Capacity (New).</p>			
Description of Issue			
<p>CMC E.8.2.8 states the formula that should be used to calculate the Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) for an Aggregated Generator Unit.</p> <p>Our calculation from applying the formula set out in CMC E.8.2.8, does not match the value for the Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) reported in the FQRs at an AGU level.</p> <p>The differences are very small and likely due to different rounding assumptions used by us compared to the SOs.</p> <p>We have done the calculation under E.8.2.8 using the generator level capacity values reported to 3 decimal places. The SOs may have undertaken the calculation on capacity values at a larger number of decimal places.</p>			
CMU ID	Monitor calculation of GDRCN (MWs)	GDRCN reported in FQRs (MWs)	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments			
<p>We consider this to be non-compliance with CMC E.8.2.8.</p> <p>We consider this could have an impact on the auction because [REDACTED] has a non-zero Net Existing De-rated Capacity. [REDACTED] has no Net Existing De-rated Capacity and therefore does not contribute an impact. However, the materiality of these impacts would be very low given the issue for [REDACTED] is only to 0.001 MWs.</p> <p>The SOs provide a response to this issue:</p> <p>“The System Operators consider this to be issue to Issue Log 16 relating to the rounding of Gross De-rated Capacity whereby differences of 0.001 MW are being identified.</p> <p>In this instance, the System Operators view that rounding issue is caused by the summing of rounded Gross De-Rated Capacity for multiple sites that make up the Aggregate Generator Unit.</p> <p>Going forward, System Operators will work with the Regulatory Authorities to implement a materiality threshold for the Capacity Auction Monitor to limit this repeat observation. ”</p>			

B.6. ISSUE LOG 022

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
022	2025/2026 T-1 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant

Summary

We find several cases of non-compliance with CMC E.8.1.1 where the Existing and Total Initial Capacities determined by the System Operators differ from the values submitted in the Applications for Qualification, without an amend code provided to explain the differences.

Description of Issue

We find cases of non-compliance with E.8.1.1. As per the CMC, this states that:

“Subject to paragraph E.8.1.2, the System Operators shall determine that the value of the Initial Capacity (Existing) and the value of the Initial Capacity (Total) for a Generator Unit or Interconnector (or a Generator contributing to an Aggregated Generator Unit) shall be the corresponding value submitted in the relevant Application for Qualification with respect to that Generator Unit or Interconnector (or Generator contributing to an Aggregated Generator Unit).”

In several cases, the Initial Capacity (Existing) is different from the value submitted in the AfQ, which in turn leads to a difference with the Initial Capacity (Total). We note that this appears to be due to the SOs rounding down the values submitted by the Participant. We mark this check as non-compliant because we did not find any amend codes to explain the differences.

We note that the two units were also non-compliant at qualification stage, as in IL003.

Generator Unit ID + Generator Name	Participant-submitted Initial Capacity (Existing)	FQRs Initial Capacity (Existing)
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]

Capacity Auction Monitor's Comments

We consider this to be non-compliance with CMC E.8.1.1, and non-compliant with E.9.4.2 as these issues were also present in the PQRs. This issue is likely to be caused by rounding issues in the CMP and is less likely to be material.

The SOs provided a response:

“As per L.5.4.1(b), all power variables shall be expressed in MW to three decimal places. In their Application for Qualification the Participant submitted their Initial Capacity Existing values to a number greater than 3 decimal places.

When uploading the data into the Capacity Market Platform, the platform does not display data beyond 3 decimal places (as per the Capacity Market Code).

Similar to Issue Log 16 and Issue Log 20, System Operators will work with the Regulatory Authorities to implement a materiality threshold for Capacity Auction Monitor to limit this repeat observation from previous auctions.”

B.7. ISSUE LOG 023

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
023	2025/2026 T-1 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant

Summary

We find several issues of non-compliance relating to the determination of Firm Offer Requirements of Capacity Market Units.

Description of Issue

CMC E.8.5.1 states that:

“For each Capacity Market Unit that is not a Demand Side Unit, the System Operators shall determine the Firm Offer Requirement as the greater of zero and the Capacity Market Unit’s De-Rated Firm Network Access Capacity determined in accordance with paragraph E.8.5.3 less the quantity of Awarded Capacity for that Capacity Market Unit for the Capacity Year allocated in previous Capacity Auctions.”

That is, $FOR = \text{MAX} (0, \text{De-rated FNAC} - \text{Awarded capacity})$

We find several units where this calculation appears to be incorrect. We note that this could have been caused by rounding differences in some instances.

[illegible]

CMC E.8.5.2 states that:

“For a Capacity Market Unit that is a Demand Side Unit or which is an aggregation of candidate units that are Demand Side Units, the System Operators shall determine the Firm Offer Requirement as the sum of the Capacity Market Unit’s Net De-Rated Capacity (Existing) Qualified to participate in the Capacity Auction.”

We find several units where this calculation appears to be incorrect.

[illegible]

[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]

Capacity Auction Monitor's Comments
<p>We find this to be non-compliance with CMC E.8.5.1 and E.8.5.2.</p> <p>In some instances we observe that some of the differences may be caused by rounding, and may be unlikely to have a material impact. However, there are cases where the differences appear to be more substantial and may present a material impact.</p> <p>The SOs provided a response to this SQ:</p> <p>“The System Operators note Capacity Auction Monitor comments that several cases of non-compliance may be caused by rounding and unlikely to have a material impact.</p> <p>For Demand Side Units where differences appear more substantial, the Capacity Market Platform is showing the Firm Offer Requirement as the SUM of Net De-Rated Capacity (Existing) and Net De-Rated Capacity (New), which is inaccurately reported. The Firm Offer Requirement should only be the SUM of net De-rated Capacity (Existing) in accordance with Capacity Market Code E.8.5.1 and E.8.5.2.</p> <p>This reporting error does not have an impact on the auction because the Mixed Integer Programme Solver for auction will only take the Net De-rated Capacity (Existing) as the Firm Offer Requirement for Demand Side Units.</p> <p>Going forward, the System Operators will seek to implement measures on the Capacity Market Platform to ensure compliance under Capacity Market Code E.8.5.1 and E.8.5.2. in future auctions.”</p>

B.8. ISSUE LOG 027

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status																															
027	2025/2026 T-1 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant																															
Summary																																		
We have identified [X] units where the CMU level values for Gross De-rated Capacity Existing have not been calculated in line with E.8.3.2.																																		
Description of Issue																																		
CMC E.8.3.2 specifies that for CMUs with Awarded Capacity, the Gross De-rated Capacity (Existing) (GDRCE) shall be the greater of:																																		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">the value determined under paragraph E.8.3.1(a); andthe volume of Awarded Capacity in respect of Existing Capacity,																																		
For the following Aggregated Generator Units, the GDRCE reported in the PQRs is not set equal to the greater of the sum of the GDRCE and the Existing Awarded Capacity. As explained above E.8.3.2 should take precedent over E.8.3.1 for AGUs, but the SOs have not done this in the CMP for the several units. We have identified this issue as part of IL008 in the PQRs. As with the PQRs, the SOs have made a correction in the table for the FQDs to the correct value.																																		
<table><tr><th>A. Sum of Generator level Gross de-rated Capacity Existing (FQRs) (E.8.3.1 (a))</th><th>B. Awarded Capacity Existing (FQRs)</th><th>C. Calculated CMU GDRCE (in accordance with E.8.3.2) C= Max (A,B)</th><th>GDRCE reported at CMU level in CMP (FQRs)</th><th>GDRCE reported at CMU level in FQDs</th></tr><tr><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td></tr><tr><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td></tr><tr><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td></tr><tr><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td></tr></table>						A. Sum of Generator level Gross de-rated Capacity Existing (FQRs) (E.8.3.1 (a))	B. Awarded Capacity Existing (FQRs)	C. Calculated CMU GDRCE (in accordance with E.8.3.2) C= Max (A,B)	GDRCE reported at CMU level in CMP (FQRs)	GDRCE reported at CMU level in FQDs	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
A. Sum of Generator level Gross de-rated Capacity Existing (FQRs) (E.8.3.1 (a))	B. Awarded Capacity Existing (FQRs)	C. Calculated CMU GDRCE (in accordance with E.8.3.2) C= Max (A,B)	GDRCE reported at CMU level in CMP (FQRs)	GDRCE reported at CMU level in FQDs																														
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]																													
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]																													
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]																													
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]																													
The value of Gross De-Rated Capacity (Total) is stated to be the greater of the value determined under E.8.3.1(c) and the volume of Awarded Capacity in respect of Existing and New Capacity.																																		
We can therefore determine that the Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) should be the greater of the value determined under E.8.3.1(b) and the volume of Awarded Capacity in respect of New Capacity. Whilst we find a case of non-compliance, the SOs have corrected this value for the FQDs.																																		
<table><tr><th>A. Sum of Generator level Gross de-rated Capacity New (FQRs) (E.8.3.1 (b))</th><th>B. Awarded Capacity New (FQRs)</th><th>C. Calculated CMU GDRCN (in accordance with E.8.3.2) C= Max (A,B)</th><th>GDRCN reported at CMU level in CMP (FQRs)</th><th>GDRCN reported at CMU level in FQDs</th></tr><tr><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td><td>[X]</td></tr></table>						A. Sum of Generator level Gross de-rated Capacity New (FQRs) (E.8.3.1 (b))	B. Awarded Capacity New (FQRs)	C. Calculated CMU GDRCN (in accordance with E.8.3.2) C= Max (A,B)	GDRCN reported at CMU level in CMP (FQRs)	GDRCN reported at CMU level in FQDs	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]																		
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[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]																													
Capacity Auction Monitor's Comments																																		
We consider this to be non-compliance with E.8.3.2. It is also an issue of non-compliance with E.9.4.2, as this has prevailed since the PQRs. As stated, these values have been corrected in the FQDs sent to the RAs.																																		

From the PQRs, we understand this to be a presentational issue in the CMP and have noted this in previous qualification processes. The CMP does not overwrite the calculation done under E.8.3.1 (a) to present the values compliant with E.8.3.2 at a CMU level.

Auction bids are made at the CMU level, so it is important that the CMU level values in the CMP are correct. We note that the Existing Net De-Rated Capacity for the [X] identified as having an incorrect GDRCE, and the New Net De-Rated Capacity for the other unit, is 0. Therefore, there would be no impact on the Auction bids for these units.

The SOs responded to this issue:

“The System Operators note the auction monitor’s comments this observation did have any impact on the auction. The System Operators acknowledge this presentational issue is reoccurring. Going forward, the System Operators will seek to implement measures on the Capacity Market Platform to ensure compliance in future auctions and subject to agreement with the Regulatory Authorities.”



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