

I-SEM 2029-30 T-4 Capacity Auction Independent Auction Monitor Report

Commission for Regulation of Utilities (CRU) and the
Utility Regulator Northern Ireland (UREGNI)

8 April 2026

AUCTION REPORT - REDACTED

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1. INDEPENDENT ASSURANCE REPORT

This report sets out our conclusions in relation to the monitoring of the processes and procedures followed by the System Operators (EirGrid and SONI Ltd; SOs) in conducting the Capacity Market Auction for the 2029/30 T-4 Capacity Auction, with respect to Capacity Auction Submissions submitted between 19th March 2026 and 10:00 on 26th March 2026, to ensure that it has been correctly carried out in accordance with the SOs' obligations under the Capacity Market Code (CMC).

1.1. SCOPE OF THE REPORT

This report is produced in accordance with the terms of our engagement contract, dated 2nd September 2022, for the purposes of reporting to the Regulatory Authorities (RAs) – the Commission for Regulation of Utilities (CRU) and the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation (UR) – in connection with CEPA's arrangement as the Capacity Auction Monitor for the I-SEM Capacity Market.

Under the CMC, the SOs have various obligations with respect to qualification for and conducting of the Capacity Auctions. These obligations apply to Capacity Auctions which the SOs are required to satisfy under the CMC. The SEM Committee's decision approving the CMC and its associated procedures are available here:

<https://www.semcommittee.com/news-centre/publication-i-sem-crm-capacity-market-code-decision>

The most up to date version of the CMC, and approved and pending modifications, are available here:

<https://www.sem-o.com/rules-and-modifications/capacity-market-modifications/market-rules/>

CEPA's role as the appointed Capacity Auction Monitor for the I-SEM is to provide independent assurance to the market and the Regulatory Authorities (RAs) that the SOs have correctly carried out their obligations under the CMC in respect of qualification for, and running of, the Capacity Auctions, as set out in the Terms of Reference for the Capacity Auction Monitor.²

We monitored the processes and procedures followed by the SOs for the Capacity Auction, as far as possible, in accordance with our Terms of Reference for this engagement. We provide our conclusions (in Section 1.4 below) in relation to compliance with the CMC based on our obligations. This report is provided in accordance with Section B.10.4 of the CMC, which sets out the requirement for the Capacity Auction Monitor to provide a report to the RAs:

- confirming the list of Participants with Capacity Market Units that have been allocated Awarded Capacity;
- stating whether or not the Capacity Auction Monitor considers that the Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with this Code; and
- identifying any actual or potential non-compliance with the CMC by the SOs.

Note that, except where expressly stated, we did not audit or otherwise verify the information provided to us by the SOs in the course of our work. A separate Capacity Market Auditor is required to be in place under the CMC, with its obligations set out within the Capacity Market Auditor Terms of Reference. For the avoidance of doubt, CEPA would like to make clear that we are a professional economic advisory firm and not professional accountants.

1.2. OUR APPROACH

We developed a set of protocols and analytical tools to monitor the processes and procedures followed by the SOs for the Capacity Auction.

² SEM Committee (2017): 'Capacity Remuneration Mechanism – Terms of Reference for the Capacity Market Auditor and Capacity Auction Monitor', SEM-17-023.

In carrying out our duties, we have followed a system of quality control, professional conduct, and ethical behaviour which we consider to be of a standard at least as demanding as that required by ISAE 3000 (Revised). This includes documented policies and procedures related to our monitoring activities, leadership responsibilities for quality control in the firm, independence and ethical requirements and management of human resources.

We have performed our work as the appointed Capacity Auction Monitor based on our fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality, and professional behaviour.

1.3. INHERENT LIMITATIONS

Our conclusions are based on historical information. The projection of any information or conclusions in the attached report to any future periods would be inappropriate.

Our examination excludes audit procedures and accordingly we do not express an audit opinion on the information. We note that the procedures we performed were not designed to and are not likely to reveal fraud.

An outline of the work we performed for the Capacity Auction is included in Appendix A.

1.4. CONCLUSIONS

Our conclusions in this report reflect reasonable assurance in relation to the T-4 Capacity Auction for the 2029/30 Capacity Year.

We believe that the procedures performed, and the evidence obtained, provide us with a reasonable basis that, except for the matters described in Section 4 of our report, the Capacity Auction was conducted by the SOs in accordance with the requirements of the CMC.

Actual and potential instances of non-compliance are summarised in Section 4.

1.5. USE OF THE REPORT

This report has been prepared for the exclusive use of the RAs in accordance with the scope of our engagement contract and the RAs' Terms of Reference for the Capacity Auction Monitor.

Our work has been undertaken solely for the purpose of assessing that the SOs have correctly carried out the obligations placed on them under the CMC in carrying out the Capacity Auction. Our work was not planned or conducted with any other objective in mind, and so cannot be relied on for any other purpose. With the exception of providing it to the RAs and the SOs, and publishing it on the SEM Committee website, our report is not to be recited or referred to in any document, copied or made available (in whole or part) to any person without our prior written consent. To the fullest extent permitted by law, CEPA does not accept or assume responsibility to anyone, other than the RAs, for this report or for the conclusions we have formed.



Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd
London, United Kingdom
8th April 2026

2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

2.1. BACKGROUND

In the I-SEM Capacity Market, capacity providers sell qualified capacity to the market to meet the capacity requirement in a future capacity year. Capacity providers who are successful in the Capacity Auction receive a regular capacity payment that assists with funding generation capacity, and, in return, they have an obligation to generate when the system is stressed.

The operation of the Capacity Market and the roles and responsibilities of the market operator – split jointly between the SOs and the Single Electricity Market Operator (SEMO) – are governed by the CMC and the Trading and Settlement Code.

2.2. OUR ROLE AS CAPACITY AUCTION MONITOR

The Terms of Reference for the Capacity Auction Monitor state that:

“The purpose of the Capacity Auction Monitor is to provide independent assurance to the market and the Regulatory Authorities that the System Operators’ are correctly carrying out their obligations under the Capacity Market Code in respect of qualification for and running of Capacity Auctions.”

As Capacity Auction Monitor, we are required to produce a Report on the Capacity Auction, within two Working Days after the SOs have released provisional Capacity Auction Results to Participants, that:

- confirms the list of Participants with Capacity Market Units that have been allocated Awarded Capacity;
- states whether or not the Capacity Auction Monitor considers that the Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the CMC; and
- where applicable, identifies any actual or potential non-compliance with the CMC or other actual or potential irregularity in the conduct of the Capacity Auction, together with the Capacity Auction Monitor’s assessment as to the likely consequences of the actual or potential non-compliance or irregularity.

This report summarises our findings in relation to the Capacity Auction run by the SOs on 26th March 2026.

2.3. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The CMC paragraph B.10.2.1 sets out that:

“The Capacity Auction Monitor shall monitor the processes and procedures followed by the System Operators in carrying out the Qualification Process, conducting Capacity Auctions and related activities under this Code, in accordance with the terms of reference determined by the Regulatory Authorities.”

The basic tasks set out for the Capacity Auction Monitor are:

- monitoring the Qualification Process to ensure that the SOs have complied with the CMC;
- being present at the auctions, with full read access to all key software, including access to all bids and all communications between the SOs and all bidders;
- monitoring the application of algorithms and calculations;
- reporting on whether it considers that the SOs have conducted the Capacity Auction in accordance with the CMC;

- identifying any actual or potential breach of the rules and regulations or other actual or potential irregularities in the conduct of the Capacity Auction by the SOs and an assessment of the consequences; and
- making recommendations on the changes to the CMC, Auction Guidelines and User Guides.

As Capacity Auction Monitor, we are required to report on all issues that we identify, irrespective of materiality.

The scope of the Capacity Auction Monitor's assurance activities shall relate to the System Operators' activities relating to qualification through to the determination of the final auction results under the Code.

2.4. SCOPE EXCLUSIONS

In line with our Terms of Reference, the scope of our review excluded the following:

- Secondary trading market (referenced specifically within Chapter H of the CMC).
- Direct investigation of market manipulation: However, the Terms of Reference states that the Capacity Auction Monitor should bring any incidents of potential market manipulation to the attention of the RAs, should it come across them in carrying out its duties.
- The determination of the LCCs and their underlying methodology: The Capacity Auction Monitor's scope in relation to LCCs is limited to assessing compliance by the SOs with the methodology for determining LCCs, including accordance with relevant procedures and process documentation.
- Auditing of the processes carried out by the SOs: The CMC requires a Capacity Market Auditor to be appointed separately from the Capacity Auction Monitor. Under our Terms of Reference, we are not required to carry out an audit of the processes followed, or information provided, by the SOs in running the auction.
- Monitoring of compliance with obligations of Section L.7 of the CMC regarding SO reporting of REMIT Data on behalf of Participants.

3. AUCTION RESULTS

The Capacity Auction Submission Commencement date for the T-4 Auction was 19th March 2026. The SOs emailed Participants at 10:14 to inform them that the auction gate had opened at 10:00 as planned. The Capacity Auction Submission End took place at 10:00 on 26th March 2026.

Capacity Auction Run Start was scheduled for 12:00 on 26th March 2026. Due to an initial error in running the auction software, Auction Run was initiated later, at 15:35, and was completed within a minute of initiation. The auction clearing process was completed within the 24-hour Allowed Timeframe.

The Capacity Auction was run using the Capacity Market Platform (CMP) version 3.4.9.1, according to information displayed in the CMP.

In line with the Final Auction Information Pack (FAIP), the parameters of the Demand Curve used in the 2029/30 T-4 Auction are set out in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Final Demand Curve used in the Capacity Auction, same as in FAIP 2029/30 T-4 Table 1

De-Rated Capacity (MW)	Demand Curve Point (€/MW per year)
0	230,000
1,876	230,000
2,803	123,090
3,870	0

The minimum and maximum capacity requirements needed to satisfy the LCCs were as set out in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: LCCs and minimum MW required, same as in FAIP 2029/30 T-4 Table 4

LCC Area 1 Name	Minimum Required Quantity (MW)	Maximum Required Quantity (MW)	LCC Area 2 Name	Minimum Required Quantity (MW)	Maximum Required Quantity (MW)
L1-1: Northern Ireland	2,203	20,000			
L1-2: Ireland	7,361	20,000	L2-1: Greater Dublin	2,426	2,426

There were 186 offers for 119 CMUs in this Capacity Auction. This is out of a total of 172 qualified CMUs³ with non-zero Net De-rated Capacity, 94 of which had Existing Capacity with a non-zero Firm Offer Requirement (and thus were required to submit offers). Of these, 80 had only Existing Capacity available to offer, and 14 had both Existing and New Capacity available to offer into this Capacity Auction. There were a further 78 CMUs that had a non-zero Firm Offer Requirement comprising only New Capacity, and therefore (under CMC F.2.1.1) these CMUs were not required to submit an offer.

182 offers were submitted directly by the relevant Participants, with 4 offers generated automatically by the Capacity Market Operator (CMO).

A total of 3862.323 MW cleared in the auction, with [x] offers from [x] CMUs being successful in the auction.

The Auction Clearing Price was determined in accordance with CMC F.8.3. The Price Setting Offer was an Inflexible offer cleared at € 135,499.99/MW per year (£125,337.49/MW per year).

³ There were a further 85 CMUs qualified due to having previously Awarded Capacity. However, their Net De-rated Capacity for this auction was zero.

3.1. CMUs PROVISIONALLY AWARDED CAPACITY IN THIS CAPACITY AUCTION

Table 3.5: List of participants and CMUs provisionally awarded capacity in the T-4 Capacity Auction for the Capacity Year 2029/30

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
AC Automation UK Limited	PY_000109	PT_500064	DSU_501200	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	4.682
Aughinish Alumina Limited	PY_000024	PT_400024	GU_400120	Autoproducer	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	55.185
Aughinish Alumina Limited	PY_000024	PT_400024	GU_400121	Autoproducer	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	55.185
Aughinish Alumina Limited	PY_000024	PT_400024	DSU_403790	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	15.025
AXPO UK LIMITED	PY_034070	PT_402560	GU_405930	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	1.896
Brookfield Green Energy NI Limited	PY_000168	PT_500110	GU_504200	Wind	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	1.014
Crag Digital Avoca Limited	PY_034122	PT_402600	GU_404840	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		New	[]	20.000
Dublin Waste to Energy	PY_000152	PT_400198	GU_402030	Steam Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[]	48.770
EirGrid Interconnector Designated Activity Company	IO_EIDAC	IO_EIDAC	I_ROIEWIC	Interconnector	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	264.500
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403860	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[]	7.407
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_502516	DSU_503460	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Both	[]	4.858
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_401870	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[]	18.797
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_402100	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[]	11.215
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403630	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[]	23.240
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_402090	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[]	14.923
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403560	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[]	21.460

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_402120	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[]	9.290
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403520	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[]	8.327
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_401400	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[]	4.051
Empower Generation Limited	PY_000111	PT_500073	GU_501230	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	12.854
ENDECO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_404090	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[]	16.395
ENDECO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_401910	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	7.739
ENDECO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_401530	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	5.121
ENDECO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_402180	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	1.644
ENDECO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_403590	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	0.512
ENDECO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_403750	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	0.512
ENDECO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED	PY_000126	PT_500099	DSU_503650	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	1.135
ENDECO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED	PY_000126	PT_500099	DSU_501460	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	3.014
ENDECO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_403690	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[]	0.640
Energy Trading Ireland Limited	PY_000113	PT_500067	DSU_501600	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	3.871
Energy Trading Ireland Limited	PY_000113	PT_500067	DSU_501510	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	3.403
Energy Trading Ireland Limited	PY_000113	PT_500067	DSU_501380	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	2.479

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
Energy Trading Ireland Limited	PY_000113	PT_500067	GU_504450	Other Storage	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[]	1.885
EnerNOC Ireland Limited	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403470	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[]	9.660
EnerNOC Ireland Limited	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403450	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[]	14.033
EnerNOC Ireland Limited	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_401270	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	8.060
EnerNOC Ireland Limited	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403030	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[]	2.139
EnerNOC Ireland Limited	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403120	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	3.655
EnerNOC Ireland Limited	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403040	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[]	2.058
EnerNOC Ireland Limited	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_401800	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[]	2.879
EnerNOC Ireland Limited	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_401610	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	3.195
EnerNOC Ireland Limited	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403050	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[]	1.978
EnerNOC Ireland Limited	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403020	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[]	1.947
EnerNOC Ireland Limited	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_401620	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[]	2.039
EP Ballylumford Limited	PY_000056	PT_500040	GU_503730	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	199.168
EP Ballylumford Limited	PY_000056	PT_500040	GU_500283	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	49.018
EP Ballylumford Limited	PY_000056	PT_500040	GU_500284	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	49.018
EP Ballylumford Limited	PY_000056	PT_500040	GU_503720	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	199.168
EP Ballylumford Limited	PY_000056	PT_500040	GU_503740	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	82.277
EP Kilroot Limited	PY_000070	PT_500045	GU_500825	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	25.287

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
EP Kilroot Limited	PY_000070	PT_500045	GU_500820	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	35.577
EP Kilroot Limited	PY_000070	PT_500045	GU_500821	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	35.577
EP Kilroot Limited	PY_000070	PT_500045	GU_500824	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	25.287
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	CAU_400301	Hydro	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	185.046
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400033	CAU_400302	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	5.703
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400033	GU_407770	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		New	[]	0.794
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400037	GU_400500	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	New	[]	16.185
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400182	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	76.050
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400183	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	76.050
ESB	PY_000030	PT_500024	GU_500041	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	44.680
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400363	Pumped Hydro Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	30.879
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400362	Pumped Hydro Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	30.879
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400325	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[]	191.160
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400324	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[]	194.400
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400850	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[]	327.683
ESB	PY_000030	PT_500024	GU_500040	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	315.373
Greenfish Power Limited	PY_034240	PT_402674	DSU_404100	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[]	6.140
Greenfish Power Limited	PY_034240	PT_502585	DSU_503780	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[]	6.140
Greenfish Power Limited	PY_034240	PT_502585	DSU_503770	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[]	6.140

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
Greenfish Power Limited	PY_034240	PT_502585	DSU_503760	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[<]	6.140
Heron Storage Limited	PY_034181	PT_502562	GU_504390	Other Storage	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[<]	2.502
Heron Storage Limited	PY_034181	PT_502562	GU_504380	Other Storage	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[<]	4.587
Indaver Energy Limited	PY_000101	PT_400087	GU_401230	Steam Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[<]	13.770
iPower Flexible Energy Ltd	PY_000093	PT_500053	DSU_503450	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[<]	6.049
iPower Flexible Energy Ltd	PY_000093	PT_402574	DSU_403650	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[<]	3.854
iPower Flexible Energy Ltd	PY_000093	PT_500053	DSU_503480	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[<]	3.316
iPower Flexible Energy Ltd	PY_000093	PT_500053	DSU_503420	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[<]	2.558
Lagan Energy (Lurgan) Ltd	PY_034238	PT_502582	GU_504360	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[<]	13.968
Lumcloon Power Limited	PY_034098	PT_402579	GU_407520	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[<]	2.160
Lumcloon Power Limited	PY_034098	PT_402579	GU_407530	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[<]	2.160
Moyle Interconnector Limited	IO_MOYLE	IO_MOYLE	I_NIMOYLE	Interconnector	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[<]	240.750
Orsted Ireland Green Energy Limited	PY_000068	PT_400062	CAU_400502	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[<]	12.786
Orsted Ireland Green Energy Limited	PY_000068	PT_400062	GU_404200	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[<]	1.418
Orsted Ireland Green Energy Limited	PY_000068	PT_400062	GU_407180	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		New	[<]	16.620
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_400144	DSU_403500	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[<]	5.424
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_400144	DSU_401660	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[<]	0.951
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_500078	DSU_501560	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Both	[<]	3.523

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_500078	DSU_501330	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	1.209
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_500078	DSU_503670	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[]	6.140
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_500078	DSU_503660	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland		New	[]	3.070
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_400144	DSU_403800	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[]	3.070
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_400144	DSU_403820	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	7.966
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_400144	DSU_403810	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Both	[]	3.070
Rengen Power Ltd	PY_034218	PT_402663	GU_407300	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		New	[]	0.120
Ronaver Energy Limited	PY_000194	PT_400460	GU_403000	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	1.762
Shannonbridge Power Limited	PY_034099	PT_402580	GU_404390	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	2.160
Shannonbridge Power Limited	PY_034099	PT_402580	GU_404380	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	2.160
SSE Airtricity Limited	PY_000021	PT_400021	CAU_400500	Wind	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	20.116
SSE Generation Ireland Ltd	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_400781	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	44.252
SSE Generation Ireland Ltd	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_400780	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	44.252
SSE Generation Ireland Ltd	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_400770	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	44.082
SSE Generation Ireland Ltd	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_400771	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	44.082
SSE Generation Ireland Ltd	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_400762	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[]	342.432
SSE Generation Ireland Ltd	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_407620	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		New	[]	4.431
SSE Generation Ireland Ltd	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_405780	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		New	[]	4.431
SSE Generation Ireland Ltd	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_407610	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland		New	[]	4.431
Statkraft Markets GmbH	PY_034046	PT_502514	GU_503960	Other Storage	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	1.192
Statkraft Markets GmbH	PY_034046	PT_502514	GU_503950	Other Storage	L1-1: Northern Ireland		Existing	[]	1.192

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
Statkraft Markets GmbH	PY_034046	PT_402540	GU_405070	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[∞]	1.889
Statkraft Markets GmbH	PY_034046	PT_402540	GU_404520	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[∞]	0.172
Statkraft Markets GmbH	PY_034046	PT_402540	GU_404010	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[∞]	0.073
Veolia Alternative Energy Ireland Limited	PY_000122	PT_400124	DSU_401880	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[∞]	11.000
Veolia Alternative Energy Ireland Limited	PY_000122	PT_400124	DSU_401490	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		Existing	[∞]	4.682

3.2. CMUs PROVISIONALLY NOT AWARDED CAPACITY IN THIS CAPACITY AUCTION

The Participant listed in Table 3.6 submitted an offer for a CMU in the T-4 Auction but was not awarded any capacity.

Table 3.6: List of participants and CMUs provisionally awarded **no** capacity in the T-4 Capacity Auction for the Capacity Year 2029/30

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403980	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[∞]	0.000
Electricity Exchange Limited	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403990	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[∞]	0.000
ENDECO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_404040	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[∞]	0.000
ENDECO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_404050	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[∞]	0.000
Astatine Limited	PY_034246	PT_402677	DSU_404220	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland		New	[∞]	0.000
SSE Renewables Tinnycross Battery Storage Limited	PY_034245	PT_402676	GU_407800	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland		New	[∞]	0.000

4. SUMMARY OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED WITH THE CAPACITY AUCTION PROCESS

We performed our role as Capacity Auction Monitor in relation to the 2029/30 T-4 Capacity Auction, which took place on 26th March 2026, in line with our obligations to monitor the conduct of the SOs in operating the Capacity Auctions. In Section 4.1, we summarise the identified instances of non-compliance within the areas of the CMC that are in the Monitor’s scope, before presenting some additional considerations in Section 4.2.

4.1. SUMMARY OF ISSUES

In carrying out our duties, we identified **4 issues** that we consider constitute non-compliance with the CMC, noting our obligation to report all issues to the RAs irrespective of materiality. The table below sets out a high-level summary of actual or potential instances of non-compliance identified within the Capacity Auction process. Detailed issue logs are included in Appendix B.

Table 4.1: Summary of issues identified within the Capacity Auction process⁵

Issue Log	Description
014	We observe cases of non-compliance with CMC C.3.2.3 on the calculation of the Initial Capacity (Existing), “ICE”, for an Aggregated Generator Unit (AGU). This is the same issue as the one described in IL003 of the Qualification Report for the 2029/2030 T-4 auction. This issue did not have a material impact on the auction given the small differences involved and the fact that the unit’s Net De-rated Capacity is zero.
017	We find issues of non-compliance relating to the determination of the Firm Offer Requirements of certain DSUs. We understand this to be a reporting issue in the CMP that does not affect the binding FOR for offers submitted in the CMP.
018	We find issues of non-compliance relating to the determination of Gross De-Rated Capacities of two DSUs. We do not consider that these issues had a material impact on the auction.
019	We find one issue of non-compliance relating to the determination of the Firm Offer Requirement for an Aggregated Generator Unit. This issue did not have a material impact on the auction given the fact that the unit’s Net De-rated Capacity is zero.

4.2. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

This sub-section contains comments and observations that we believe do not represent non-compliance with the CMC, but we consider it appropriate to summarise for the RAs’ attention.

4.2.1. Attempted offer submission by non-qualified unit

A Participant submitted an Exception Application for a 10-year Maximum Capacity Duration for a unit ([§<]) to the RAs, which was approved. However, no Application for Qualification (AfQ) was submitted to the SOs for this unit. The unit was therefore not qualified.

During the Capacity Auction Submission period, the Participant attempted to make an offer on the CMP into the capacity auction for this unit, and when unsuccessful, contacted the SOs. Having investigated their situation, the

⁵ Issue numbers are assigned to potential instances of non-compliance as they are identified. Issue numbers missing from the table (e.g., Issue 015) may reflect issues investigated as part of the Monitor’s Qualification Report for this Auction or may reflect issues that have been investigated and determined not to represent non-compliance with the CMC.

SOs informed the Participant that they were not qualified for this auction and therefore were not eligible to submit an offer.

The Participant subsequently attempted to submit a manual offer to the SOs using the manual offer process. This offer was considered not valid by the SOs and was not included in the auction clearing. We consider that the SOs' actions in this instance were in line with CMC F.2.1.1 which states that only qualified capacity can be offered into the auction.

4.2.2. Submitted offers with capacity duration of 0 years

A Participant initially submitted offers for three of their units ([redacted]) with capacity duration of 0 years. Given the capacity duration must be at least 1 year (according to F.7.1.1(j)), these were non-valid offers. This issue was identified by the SOs prior to gate closure. They contacted the Participant to inform them that their offer for the above units was not a valid one. The SOs noted that this should be corrected by gate closure, otherwise the provisions of F.7.1.3 would apply, i.e. the SOs would determine a set of price-quantity pairs for them with a capacity duration of one year. The Participant then amended the offer on the CMP with a valid capacity duration prior to gate closure.

To avoid such issues occurring in the future, we recommend considering an automated "validation" check for duration values on offers submitted by Participants on the CMP.

4.2.3. Price caps for units with approved Exception Application for Intermediate Length Contract

As part of the Exception Application process, Participants can apply for an Intermediate Length Contract (ILC) with a duration of 5 years. When a Participant's application for an ILC is approved, a corresponding Unit Specific Price Cap (USPC) for that ILC is also approved.

In addition to having an approved ILC USPC, some units ([redacted]) also had a USPC for a 1-year capacity duration. For these units, their capacity included in the ILC is subject to an annual run-hour limit and therefore a lower de-rating factor than their existing capacity. This means that the de-rated capacity associated with an approved 5-year ILC is lower than the 1-year existing de-rated capacity. Different price caps also apply to the two types of contracts, with a lower USPC typically approved for a 1-year contract relative to the ILC USPC. Essentially, the Participant can offer in the auction either their lower de-rated capacity with a 5-year duration at a higher price cap or a higher de-rated capacity for a 1-year contract at the lower USPC. The CMP currently has a limitation and can only accommodate one price cap per type of capacity (existing or new).

In these instances, the SOs opted to include the 1-year USPC for these four units in the CMP as default. Equally the units were qualified based on their current (higher) existing de-rated capacity, not just the de-rated capacity eligible for the ILC. The SOs told us that they informed the Participants of the default USPC application and that the SOs would modify this if any of the Participants wanted to avail of the 5-year ILC.

To allow greater flexibility in how Participants submit their offers, we recommend that functionality is added to CMP to accommodate different price caps and contract duration for the same type of capacity.

4.2.4. FQRs in CMP not reflective of complex CMC paragraphs

Sections E.8.3.1 and E.8.3.2 of the CMC together set out the calculation of the Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) and the Net De-Rated Capacity (Existing) of a CMU. We understand that the CMP follows the calculations set out in E.8.3.1 only and it does not make any adjustments for awarded capacity in line with E.8.3.2. For one unit, [redacted], this resulted in a value displaying the FQRs based solely on calculations per E.8.3.1, even though adjustments for awarded capacity per E.8.3.2 should have been made. We understand that the SOs make a manual adjustment to the value to reflect E.8.3.2 in the Final Qualification Decisions shared with the RAs.

Similarly, sections E.7.8.2 (f) and E.7.8.2 (h) of the CMC set out the calculation of the Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) and Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) for Demand Side Unit or Generator Unit referred to in paragraph

E.2.1.1(e) that is a Variable Generator Unit, that have undergone the Alternative Qualification Process. The SOs have indicated it is not possible to set the Gross De-Rated Capacity values of AQP units in to the CMP equal to the awarded capacity of the units, but the SOs have reflected it in the values sent to the RAs.

Therefore, due to these adjustments, we do not consider this to be non-compliance, provided the Participant is also aware that the values in the CMP do not account for any awarded capacity. We also note that, when the CMC provisions referenced above bind, the Net De-rated Capacity of the units would be zero (since the provisions apply when the awarded capacity is greater than the Gross De-rated Capacity of the unit).

4.2.5. Capacity Auction Threshold versus Capacity Aggregation Threshold

The CMC F.5.1.3 requires the SOs to include a Capacity Auction Threshold in the FAIP. This term is different from the Capacity Aggregation Threshold which is required to be included in the IAIP (as per D.3.1.3). The Capacity Auction Threshold is not a term defined in the CMC.

The SOs have included a Capacity Aggregation Threshold in the FAIP and included a footnote to explain that this is different from the term used in the CMC.

We assume that the Capacity Auction Threshold referred to under F.5.1.3 and the Capacity Aggregation Threshold under D.3.1.3 are intended to describe the same concept and value. If this is the case, we suggest revising the CMC to ensure consistency in terminology used.

Appendix A SUMMARY OF WORK PERFORMED

Our fieldwork was completed on the 26th March 2026 at the System Operators' premises at The Oval, Shelbourne Road, Dublin. Additional members of the CAM team also observed the process for this Auction using conference calling and screen-sharing. The areas of the Code checked at the time of issuing this report are outlined in the table below.

The areas of the Code checked at the time of issuing this report are outlined in the table below.

Table A.1: Summary of CMC sections checked by the Monitor in preparing this report

CMC Chapter	CMC Subsection	CMC Paragraph	
C. De-Rating and Capacity Concepts	C.2 Locational Capacity Constraints	C.2.1.2	
	C.2 Locational Capacity Constraints	C.2.2.2	
	C.2 Locational Capacity Constraints	C.2.3.1	
	C.2 Locational Capacity Constraints	C.2.3.2	
	C.3 Initial Capacity	C.3.2.1	
	C.3 Initial Capacity	C.3.2.3	
	C.3 Initial Capacity	C.3.5.1	
	D. Pre-Capacity Auction Process	D.2 Capacity Auctions and Timetables	D.2.1.5
			D.2.1.9
D.2.1.10			
D.2.1.11			
D.2.1.14			
D.2.1.16			
D.2.1.17			
E. Qualification	E.1 Purpose of Qualification Process	E.1.1.4	
	E.3 Opt-out Notifications	E.3.1.4	
	E.4 Application for Qualification	E.4.1.8	
	E.5 Exception Applications	E.5.1.10	
	E.8 Qualification Calculations	E.8.1	E.8.1.1
		E.8.1	E.8.1.2
		E.8.1	E.8.1.3
		E.8.2	E.8.2.1
		E.8.2	E.8.2.2
		E.8.2	E.8.2.4
		E.8.2	E.8.2.5
		E.8.2	E.8.2.7
		E.8.2	E.8.2.8
		E.8.3	E.8.3.1
		E.8.3	E.8.3.2
E.8.4	E.8.4.1		
E.8.5	E.8.5.1		
E.8.5	E.8.5.2		
E.8.5	E.8.5.3		
E.8.6	E.8.6.1		
E.8.7	E.8.7.1		

CMC Chapter	CMC Subsection	CMC Paragraph
		E.8.8.1
		E.8.8.2
		E.8.8.3
		E.8.9.1
		E.8.9.2
	E.9 Notification of Qualification Decisions	E.9.3.3
		E.9.3.5
		E.9.3.6
E. Qualification	E.9 Notification of Qualification Decisions	E.9.4.1
		E.9.4.2
		E.9.4.3
		E.9.4.4
		E.9.4.9
		E.9.5.1
F. Capacity Auctions	F.1 General	F.1.2.2
	F.2. Capacity Auction Participation	F.2.1.1
	F.3 Demand Curve	F.3.1.1
		F.3.1.2
		F.3.1.6
		F.3.1.7
	F.4 Determination of Locational Capacity Constraints for a Capacity Auction	F.4.1.1
		F.4.1.2
		F.4.1.4
		F.4.1.5
		F.4.1.6
		F.4.1.7
	F.5 Publication of Final	F.5.1.1
		F.5.1.2
		F.5.1.3
	F.6 Capacity Auction Submissions	F.6.1.1
		F.6.2.1
	F.7 Capacity Auction Offers	F.7.1.1
		F.7.1.2
		F.7.1.3
	F.8 Conduct of Capacity Auction	F.8.1.1
		F.8.2.1
		F.8.2.2
		F.8.2.3
		F.8.3.2
		F.8.3.3
		F.8.3.4
		F.8.3.5
		F.8.4.2
		F.8.4.3
		F.8.4.4
		F.8.4.5

CMC Chapter	CMC Subsection	CMC Paragraph
		F.8.4.6
		F.8.4.7
		F.8.5.1
		F.8.6.1
	F.9 Capacity Auction Results	F.9.1.1
		F.9.2.1
		F.9.3.1
K. Exchange Rates	K.2 Methodology	K.2.1.6
L. Data and Information Systems	L.2 Methodology	L.2.2.2
		L.2.3.1
		L.2.4.3
		L.2.4.4
		L.2.5.1
		L.2.5.2
		L.2.5.3
		L.2.5.4
		L.2.5.5
	L.3 Submission, Validation and Rejection of Data Transactions	L.3.1.1
		L.3.1.3
		L.3.1.6
		L.3.1.7
		L.3.1.8
	L.4 Communications Failures	L.4.2.1
		L.4.2.3
		L.4.3.1
		L.4.3.3
		L.4.3.4
		L.4.4.2
		L.4.4.3
	L.5 Data Publication	L.5.4.1

Appendix B **SUMMARIES OF OBSERVED ISSUES RESULTING FROM THE CAPACITY AUCTION PROCESS**

B.1. **ISSUE LOG 014**

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
014	2029/2030 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant

Summary

We observe cases of non-compliance with CMC C.3.2.3 on the calculation of the Initial Capacity (Existing), “ICE”, for an Aggregated Generator Unit (AGU). This is same issue as the one described in IL003 of the Qualification Report for the 2029/2030 T-4 auction.

Description of Issue

CMC paragraph C.3.2.3. states: *“For a Generator that is part of an Aggregated Generator Unit, the Initial Capacity (Existing) for a Capacity Year shall be its contribution to the Registered Capacity of the Aggregated Generator Unit, and, where applicable, shall be consistent with the relevant Generator Aggregator System Operator Agreement.”*

We find that for each Generator Unit that forms part of [REDACTED], the ICE is consistent (to 3 decimal places) with the values reported in the Generator Aggregator System Operator Agreement. However, we find that the sum of all of the Initial Capacity (Existing) values of each Generator Unit comprising the AGU does not equal (at 3 dps) to the Registered Capacity of the AGU.

The Registered Capacity of [REDACTED] provided by the SOs to the Capacity Auction Monitor is [REDACTED] MW, however as is shown in the table below, the sum of all of the ICEs of the generator units comprising the AGU equals [REDACTED] MW.

We therefore find this to be non-compliant with C.3.2.3.

Generator Unit ID	Generator ID	Existing Initial Capacity (MW)
Total		[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

This issue was also described in IL003 of the Monitor’s Qualification Report. In response to that issue log, the SOs disagreed that the above represents a non-compliance with C3.2.3. The SOs noted that the discrepancy between the numbers relates to a rounding issue, due to the fact that [REDACTED] different sites are listed on the GASOA, and capacity values are expressed in kW often to 4 or 5 decimal places. When these values are converted from kW to MW across [REDACTED] sites, then rounded individually before being summed, a small rounding difference can arise.

Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments

We find this to be non-compliant with CMC C.3.2.3.

Given that the initial capacity in the FQRs is higher than the Registered Capacity of the unit, this could affect the calculation of the GDRCE of the unit. However, we note that this would not have a material impact on the auction given the small differences involved. The GDRCE of the unit is also lower than the unit’s Awarded Capacity so the unit does not have any Net De-rated Capacity that can be offered in this auction.

B.2. ISSUE LOG 017

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
017	2029/2030 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant

Summary

We find issues of non-compliance relating to the determination of the Firm Offer Requirements of the following DSUs.

Description of Issue

CMC E.8.5.2 sets out that “For a Capacity Market Unit that is a Demand Side Unit or which is an aggregation of candidate units that are Demand Side Units, the System Operators shall determine the Firm Offer Requirement (FOR) as the sum of the Capacity Market Unit’s Net De-Rated Capacity (Existing) Qualified to participate in the Capacity Auction.”

We find [X] units where this calculation has not been applied correctly (i.e. where the values in the two orange cells below are not equal. In all instances, the FOR has been calculated as the sum of Capacity Market Unit’s Net De-Rated Capacity (Existing) plus Capacity Market Unit’s Net De-Rated Capacity (New). This is in line with a wording of paragraph E.8.5.2 in previous versions of the CMC (v11 and older), but not the current one.

We also note that the Net Firm Offer Requirement changed for a number of these units between PQRs and FQRs.

CMU ID	Net Firm Offer Requirements (PQRs)	Net Firm Offer Requirements (FQRs)	Net Existing De-Rated Capacity (FQRs)	Net New De-Rated Capacity (FQRS)
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]

Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments

We find this to be non-compliant with CMC E.8.5.2

We understand this to be a reporting issue in the CMP, and the SOs have explained that when a Participant submits an offer, the FOR that is binding is equal to the Net Existing De-rated Capacity.

B.3. ISSUE LOG 018

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
018	2029/30 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-compliant

Summary

We find issues of non-compliance relating to the determination of Gross De-Rated Capacities of [redacted] DSUs.

Description of Issue

As per CMC E.8.2.4:

“The System Operators shall determine the Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) of a Generator Unit or Interconnector (other than an Aggregated Generator Unit) which is not a Variable Generator Unit in accordance with the following formula:

$$GDRCN = \text{MAX}[0, \text{MIN}[\text{DRFT} \times \text{ADRFT} \times \text{ICT} \times (1 + \text{INCTOL}), \text{MAX}[\text{DRFT} \times \text{ADRFT} \times \text{ICT} \times (1 - \text{DECTOL}), \text{NDRVE} + \text{NDRVN}]] - \text{GDRCE}]”$$

We find discrepancies in the calculated values and the values reported by the SOs. We use the following acronyms for checks on CMC E.8.2.4

- ADRFT: ARHL De-Rating Factor (assumed to be 1 for the two units below)
- ICT: Initial Capacity Total
- INCTOL: Increase Tolerance (assumed to be zero for DSUs)
- DECTOL: Decrease Tolerance (assumed to be 1 for DSUs)
- NDRVE: Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) Nominated
- NDRVN: Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) Nominated

For the [redacted] units listed in the table below, we find differences between the values we calculated as per E.8.2.4 and the Gross New De-Rated Capacity reported in the FQR.

Generator Unit ID	Initial Capacity Existing (FQRs)	Initial Capacity New (FQRs)	DRFT (IAIP)	NDRVE (Participant application)	NDRVN (Participant application)	GDRCE (FQRs)	GDRCN (calc)	GDRCN (FQRs)
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

These units were rejected in the PQRs, and are now accepted following successful Applications for Review.

Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments

We find this to be non-compliant with CMC E.8.2.4.

For the first unit, there is no material impact on the auction since the unit’s Net De-Rated Capacity to offer in the auction remains at zero.

This would not be the case for the second unit who had no new awarded capacity and therefore could have offered new capacity into the auction. However, we note that this unit made an offer in the auction based on their existing capacity only.

B.4. ISSUE LOG 019

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
019	2029/2030 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant

Summary

We find one issue of non-compliance relating to the determination of the Firm Offer Requirement for an Aggregated Generator Unit.

Description of Issue

CMC E.8.5.1 and CMC E.8.5.3 together set the Firm Offer Requirement for Aggregated Generator Units.

CMC E.8.5.1 states:

“For each Capacity Market Unit that is not a Demand Side Unit, the System Operators shall determine the Firm Offer Requirement as the greater of zero and the Capacity Market Unit’s De-Rated Firm Network Access Capacity determined in accordance with paragraph E.8.5.3 less the quantity of Awarded Capacity for that Capacity Market Unit for the Capacity Year allocated in previous Capacity Auctions.”

FOR = max (0, De-Rated Firm Network Access Capacity – Awarded Capacity)

We found one instance of non-compliance, as the FOR should equal the greater of zero and the De-Rated Firm Network Access Capacity minus the Awarded Capacity.

CMU ID	Gross Firm Offer Requirement (FQRs)	Net Firm Offer Requirement (FQRs)	De-Rated Firm Network Access Capacity (CAM calc using application data and information requests)	Existing Awarded Capacity (FQRs)	New Awarded Capacity (FQRs)	CAM calculation as per E.8.5.1 (CAM calc)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

We also raised the same issue regarding this unit in IL010 of our Qualification Report for the T-4 2029/30 auction.

Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments

We find this to be technically non-compliant with CMC E.8.5.1, however we consider that this issue did not have an impact on the auction.

The Gross De-rated Capacity Existing for this unit ([REDACTED] MW in FQDs, or [REDACTED] MWs on CMP) is equal to or less than the value of Existing Awarded Capacity, and the Gross De-rated Capacity New ([REDACTED] MW) is equal to or lower than the value of New Awarded Capacity. Therefore, the unit has no remaining capacity to offer into the auction.



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